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DUNS SCOTUS, DEMONSTRATION, 
AND DOCTRINE 
William E. Mann 
The first question raised in the Prologue to John Duns Scotus's Commentary 
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard is "Whether It Is Necessary for Man in 
His Present State To Be Supernaturally Inspired With Some Doctrine." 
Scotus's answer is "Yes," but only after a lenthy discussion of several impor-
tant epistemological issues connected to understanding and faith. This essay 
provides some of the background necessary for appreciating Scotus's views. 
It begins with a discussion of the Aristotelian conception of demonstration, 
laying emphasis on the distinction between demonstration of a fact and dem-
onstration of the reason for the fact. It then considers the role of authority in 
generating knowledge that is not demonstrative, the notion of scientia, and 
the difference between Aristotle and Scotus on natural necessity. Special 
attention is givcn to Scotus's view on understanding terms, understanding 
propositions, and being cognitively neutral with respect to a proposition. The 
essay concludes with a reconstruction of the first of five arguments that 
Scot us gives for his position. If the reconstruction is correct, then Scotus's 
argument is even more dependent on revelation than <lppe<lrs initially. 
The Prologue of John Duns Scotus's Commentary all the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard takes up the first hefty volume of the critical edition of his works. 
The first question of the Prologue is "Whether It Is Necessary for Man in His 
Present State To Be Supernaturally Inspired with Some Doctrine. "I You will 
not be surprised to know that the answer is "Yes," nor will you be surprised, 
if you know that Scotus was called "The Subtle Doctor," to find out that it 
takes him a while to get to that answer: arguments, counter-arguments, epi-
cyclic arguments, etc., must be examined, defended, or refuted on the way to 
a determination of the question. You might be surprised, however, to come 
across the following passage added in the margin early in the Prologue: 
Note that nothing supernatural can be shown by natural reason to be in the 
wayf<lrer, nor necessarily required for his perfection; nor can one having it 
even know it to be in him. Therefore it is impossible here to use natural reason 
against Aristotle: if it be argued from beliefs, it is not an argument [ratio] 
against the philosopher, since he will not concede a belief as a premise. Hence 
these arguments made here against him have as one or the other premise a 
belief or [something] proved from belief; thus they are only theological 
persuasions, from beliefs to a belief. [' 12]2 
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Arguing theology with the converted would seem to have the same comforts 
and limitations as preaching to the choir. Those with a missionary flair will 
hanker to have a go at the heathen. If Scotus is right, theology, at least that 
part of it that depends on revelation, will get nowhere with heathen philoso-
phers. Scotus's project, to show that we need divine inspiration, will succeed 
only with the faithful, that is, those who already have divine inspiration. 3 And 
those people, according to Scotus, will not know that they have it. The 
situation is peculiar. It is as if someone told you that in order to become a 
great chef, you have to acquire the ability to taste X. The same person, who 
happens to have written Cooking with X, further maintains that the non-X-
tasting chefs deny any claims made about X by those who profess to be 
X-tasting chefs, and that even the real X-tasting chefs are not aware that they 
can taste X. Confronted with these claims, you might come to have sympathy 
as never before for verification ism. Although the situation is peculiar, it might 
be perfectly respectable. There might be independent ways of detecting the 
presence of X and thus of testing the capacities for (unconscious) taste dis-
crimination in chefs. Even so, the case of theology would still be somewhat 
different. The faithful will insist that there is an independent Someone Who 
knows exactly who is divinely inspired and who is not, but the faithful will 
also acknowledge that that being is not in the habit of tipping His hand. 
Scotus knew the difference between persuasion and demonstration. Dem-
onstration is rationally compelling; persuasion can do no more than give 
(nonconclusive) reasons to believe. Scotus did not extend the methodological 
caveat of -,r 12 to all theological inquiry. He believed, for example, that God's 
existence, omniscience, and omnipotence can be demonstrated. That we need 
divine revelation, in contrast, is indemonstrable. Yet the arguments strewn 
throughout the Prologue appear to be demonstrations. No doubt that is why 
Scotus felt obliged to add the contents of -,r12 in the margin. The following 
remarks can be taken as a prologue to Scotus's Prologue. I attempt to provide 
the conceptual background necessary for appreciating Scotus's claim that his 
arguments for the necessity of revelation are not demonstrations. I conclude 
by applying the conceptual apparatus to the first of Scotus's positive argu-
ments, contained in -,r13. 
1. The Strict and the Loose Aristotelian Conception of Demonstration 
Let us begin by describing "the Aristotelian conception of demonstration"-
the ACD, for short-leaving for another time the question whether the defi-
nite description has the same accuracy as "the Holy Roman Empire." The 
ACD is realized when one is able to organize into a deductive hierarchy a 
body of knowledge about a particular domain, whose contents and boundaries 
are determined by the terms distinctive of the domain. The hierarchy is 
founded in a set of axioms, propositions that are necessarily true and imme-
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diately evident to anyone capable of understanding the terms contained in 
them. From the axioms one is able to deduce theorems, propositions that are 
necessarily true but not immediately evident, by means of inferential patterns 
that instantiate valid syllogistic moods. The deductive hierarchy, from what 
is immediately evident to what is less and less evident (but still necessary) 
is isomorphic to an ontological hierarchy to be found in nature, from what is 
simple to what is more and more complex. Call this structural feature of the 
deductive hierarchy-from more evident necessary truths to less evident but 
equally necessary truths-the transmission condition. The notion of being 
more (or less) evident that is encoded in the transmission condition has at 
least two independent components, one ontic and pertaining primarily to 
terms, the other epistemic and pertaining primarily to propositions. 
The antic component is this: a term, lj, is ontically more evident than 
another term, t2, if and only if t1 is ontically prior to (2. The notion of antic 
priority is difficult to capture at best, but the following rudimentary remarks 
are sufficient for our purposes. Consider the proposition that squares are 
rectangles whose adjacent sides are equal. In it, "rectangle," "adjacent," 
"side," and "equal [in length]" are all terms that are ontically prior to 
"square." In general, the term for any species is ontically posterior to the 
terms for its genus and differentia, and also to any terms that are ontically 
prior to the genus and differentia terms. Thus, a tree of Porphyry is a good 
place to locate relations of ontic priority. Finally, let us note the following 
feature about ontic priority. Consider these two propositions: 
(1) Every rectangle whose adjacent sides are equal has the sum of its interior 
angles equal to 360°. 
(2) Every square has the sum of its interior angles equal to 360°. 
If we were to extend the notion of ontic priority from terms to propositions, 
we would say that (l) is ontically prior to (2), even though the subject terms 
in (1) and (2) are necessarily coextensive. This sort of example illustrates the 
fact that the notion of ontic priority is too fine-grained to be given an analysis 
solely in extensional terms.4 
The epistemic component of the transmission condition maintains that if 
proposition P is a part or the whole of the explanation for proposition Q, then 
one cannot know that Q without knowing that P. The epistemic component 
sets a high standard for episteme, or scientific knowledge. One knows that Q 
if and only if one knows the explanation for Q, and knowing the explanation 
for Q requires being able to trace the deductive hierarchy culminating in Q 
back to its axioms: the axioms themselves are self-explanatory. 
The paradigm syllogistic mood is Barbara LLL,5 a first-figure mood whose 
premises and conclusion are universal affirmative propositions, all of which 
are necessary: 
DUNS SCOTUS, DEMONSTRATION, AND DOCTRINE 
Necessarily, Every M is P. 
Necessarily, Every S is M . 
... Necessarily, Every S is P. 
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The terms that fill in for the M, P, and S placeholders (middle term, predicate 
term of the conclusion, and subject term of the conclusion, respectively) 
should neither be nor contain names or descriptions of individuals: episieme 
is ideally knowledge of the relations between universals. 
What I have just described is the strict version of the ACD. The strict 
version is Aristotle's official doctrine, announced in Chapter 2 of Book I of 
the Posterior Analytics. By the time Aristotle reaches Chapter 13, he is 
willing to relax the fetters. Medieval philosophers like Scotus, following 
Aristotle's lead, distinguished between demonstratio quia and demonstratio 
propter quid, harking back to a distinction, made in Chapter 13, between 
understanding a fact and understanding the reason for the fact. In a propter 
quid demonstration, the attribute picked out by the syllogism's middle term 
explains why the attribute referred to by the predicate term of the conclusion 
applies to the subject of the conclusion. To be somewhat more specific, the 
middle term of a propter quid demonstration will specify the material, formal, 
efficient, or final cause for the predication exhibited by the conclusion. The 
medievals described quia demonstrations, in contrast, as arguments from 
effect to cause. In cases in which we are more familiar with an effect than 
its cause, a proposition designating the effect serves as middle term in a quia 
demonstration whose conclusion is a proposition about the less familiar 
cause. 6 In Chapter 13, Aristotle is willing to countenance a loose version of 
the ACD, one that admits quia demonstrations. Consider the following two 
Barbara syllogisms (with modality prefixed), adapted from Chapter 13:7 
(S 1) L Every nontwinkIing celestial body is a nearby celestial body. 
(S2) 
L Every planet is a nontwinkIing celestial body. 
L Every planet is a nearby celestial body. 
L Every nearby celestial body is a nontwinkling celestial body. 
L Every planet is a nearby celestial body. 
L Every planet is a nontwinkIing celestial body. 
(S I) is a quia demonstration, a demonstration of the fact that the planets 
are near Earth. The attribute specified by its middle term, being a non twinkling 
celestial body, is not the material, formal, efficient, or final cause of the 
planets' being near and thus does not explain why the planets are near. (S2) 
is a demonstratio propter qUid whose middle term refers to an attribute, being 
a nearby celestial body, that is either the formal or efficient cause of the 
planets' not twinkling. Thus only (S2) counts as an explanation, even though 
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the terms in the major premises of the two syllogisms are convertible. Even 
if, by Aristotle's lights, the attributes of being a nontwinkling celestial body 
and being a nearby celestial body are coextensive, and necessarily so, proper 
explanation flows in one direction only: the planets' nearness explains their 
nontwinkling but not vice versa. 
No doubt it has occurred to you that it cannot be that both (S 1) and (S2) 
satisfy the transmission condition. For the conclusion of (S I) is the minor 
premise of (S2), and the conclusion of (S2) is the minor premise of (S 1). If 
(S 1)'s conclusion is less evident than its minor premise, it follows that (S2)'s 
conclusion (=the minor premise of (SI» is more evident than (S2)'s minor 
premise (=the conclusion of (S 1)). Analogous remarks hold for the case in 
which (S2)'s conclusion is less evident than its minor premise. Either (S 1) or 
(S2) might meet the transmission condition, but not both. It will also have 
occurred to you that for most if not all of us, it seems natural to say that the 
transmission condition is satisfied by (S 1), not (S2). It is more obvious to us 
that the planets are nontwinklers than that they are comparatively near. But 
if (S2) is the propter quid demonstration, then the planets' comparative near-
ness is more evident than their nontwinkling.8 The situation may appear to 
be a case in which the ontic component of the transmission condition conflicts 
with the epistemic component. Insofar as the ACD is a model for episieme, 
it assigns pride of place to (S2), the propter quid demonstration, in a fully 
worked-out theory of celestial mechanics. The strict version of the ACD 
would banish quia demonstrations like (S 1) from its finished scientific the-
ories by appeal to the ontic component of the transmission condition. It is 
easy enough to grant that "being nearby" is ontically prior to "being a non-
twinkler." Yet it is natural to suppose that the epistemic component of the 
transmission condition delivers the opposite verdict, for surely we can know 
that the planets do not twinkle without knowing that they are nearby. 
In fact, the epistemic component does not deliver that verdict. Recall that 
it says that if P is explanatory of Q, then one cannot know that Q if one does 
not know that P. Applied to the present case, the epistemic component implies 
that if the planets' being nearby explains their nontwinkling, then we cannot 
know that they are nontwinkling if we do not know that they are nearby. But 
now two questions clamor for attention. Is it not simply the case that this 
standard for knowledge is unrealistically high? And if Aristotelians want to 
set the standard that high, what is the point of counting quia demonstrations 
as demonstrations at all, since they fail to meet the standard? 
II. Earlier than Gettier 
To respond to the second question first, I suggest that it is fruitful to think 
of some quia demonstrations as attempts to regiment inferences to the best 
explanation into the confines of syllogistic form.9 In the case of (S I), we take 
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the fact that the planets do not twinkle to be best accounted for by the 
proposition that they are nearby. If the general hypothesis that constitutes the 
major premise of (S1) is true, then the planets' nontwinkling is conclusive 
evidence for their being nearby. But-now to address the first question-quia 
demonstrations that are inferences to the best explanation do not confer 
episteme. At a minimum, they confer true belief, but true belief does not count 
as episteme. At a maximum, they confer justified true belief, but justified true 
belief does not count as episteme. If I am right about this, then you could be 
in three different cognitive states with regard to a true proposition, other than 
nescience, doubt, and disbelief. You could believe the true proposition, you 
could believe it with justification, or you could know it with episteme. Quia 
demonstrations in the absence of an ability to produce a propter quid dem-
onstration can yield the first two cognitive states but not the third. 
Let me hasten to say that I do not claim to find all three cognitive states 
discriminated by Aristotle. As far as I can tell, Aristotle may have thought 
that, with respect to quia demonstrations, the maximum collapses into the 
minimum. I have found no evidence to suggest that he had a conception of 
justification that would have allowed for justificatory mechanisms and meth-
ods distinct from the ability to produce propter quid demonstrations. Thus I 
cannot disprove the hypotheses that for Aristotle, epistellle ~ justified true 
belief and that quia demonstrations like (S 1), in the absence of corresponding 
propter quid demonstrations like (S2), generate "knowledge" only if knowl-
edge is allowed to extend to (unjustified) true belief. What I am prepared to 
defend, however, is the proposition that medieval philosophers had reason to 
sort out the three cognitive states, because they had reason to acknowledge 
justificatory procedures apart from the procedure of producing a propter quid 
demonstration. 
Contrast the following two cases. Think first of Socrates's procedure with 
Meno's slave in Plato's Mella. By the end of Socrates's interrogation, the 
slave sees that a square having twice the area of a given square has a side 
whose length is equal to the hypotenuse of the given square. Socrates is 
careful to point out that although the slave now has true belief about this 
theorem of geometry, he does not yet have knowledge. The true belief can 
be converted into knowledge by the same questions being put to him on many 
occasions and in many ways (Mella 8SC). This procedure does not obviously 
satisfy Aristotle's conditions for episteme, but of course Plato is bent on 
establishing the doctrine of Recollection, not the validity of epistemic dem-
onstration. It is significant, however, that Socrates and Plato do not regard 
Socrates s knowing the theorem, conducting the interrogation, and eliciting 
the correct belief as sufficient to convert the slave's belief into knowledge. 
Authority carries no weight: Plato seems to believe that because some "au-
thorities" are humbugs, and we have no way to sort out the humbugs from 
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the genuine authorities short of knowing the subject matter for ourselves, to 
ground any belief in an appeal to authority is to fail to justify it. 
The second, contrasting case is provided by Saint Augustine. In De utilirate 
credendi xii, 26 Augustine says that insofar as knowledge requires demon-
strative reasoning, one cannot know who one's parents are.1O Augustine him-
self believes, on the basis of various relevant authorities, that Patricius is his 
father and Monica his mother. He regards that belief as justified, both episte-
mically and morally. Here is a case, then, in which one can have justified 
true belief but not have knowledge, a case that Augustine regards as illustrat-
ing the fact that one can believe on authority what one knows one does not 
know (xi, 25). As if to underscore the point, when Augustine surveys De 
utilitate credendi thirty-five years later, he acknowledges that we sometimes 
speak loosely of knowing something which we believe truly and justifiedly 
on the basis of reliable authority; this use is even sanctioned by Scripture. 
Nevertheless, there is a strict sense of knowing, one that requires reason and 
understanding, according to which that cognitive state is not knowledge 
(Retractationes I, xiv, 3). 
Augustine thus discriminates between justified true belief and knowledge. 
But he did not, for all of that, scoop Edmund Gettier. One can always distin-
guish, as Augustine does, justified true belief from knowledge by claiming 
that the concept of knowledge is equivocal. Gettier-style counterexamples do 
more than that: they purport to show that knowledge is not justified true belief 
according to any natural and univocal concept of knowledge. What is note-
worthy about Augustine's example, in contrast to Plato's, is its reliance on 
the testimony of authority as a legitimate means of justification. Of course, 
the reliance on authority is what one would expect to find in a Christian 
philosopher, for whom Scripture is an authoritative source of revealed truth: II 
Because of the ubiquity of Aristotle's and Augustine's influence on medi-
eval philosophy, one generally finds scholastic philosophers attempting to 
show that there is no irresolvable conflict between the two. It might seem as 
though the onus to achieve harmony between them would have been relieved, 
especially for a fourteenth~century Franciscan like Scotus, by the Condem-
nation of 1277, which is generally understood to be a reassertion of Augus-
tinianism and a rejection of Aristotelianism. 12 The closest the Condemnation 
comes to our present concerns is in condemned proposition 37: "That nothing 
is to be believed unless it is evident in itself or can be shown from what is 
evident in itself."13 If this proposition expresses an error, then we are entitled, 
perhaps even enjoined, to believe something that is neither evident in itself 
nor demonstrable from what is evident in itself. But it simply does not follow, 
nor does the Condemnation suggest that it follows, that we thereby know what 
we are entitled to believe. 14 I suspect that Scotus, looking back at the Con-
demnation, appreciated the lack of entailment, saw that it gave no reason to 
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oppose Augustine to Aristotle, and perhaps saw that it conferred some benefit 
on Christian thought. Episteme can still be reserved for self-evident truths 
and propter quid demonstrations, while justified true belief can be generated 
by those quia demonstrations that function as inferences to the best explana-
tion. 15 The benefit to Christian thought is this. Christian faith is supposed to 
be a virtue, which involves, among other things, one's believing things that 
one cannot know by natural means. If quia demonstrations are not knowl-
edge-conferring, they nevertheless may enable the Christian believer to argue 
for the reasonableness of believing where we cannot prove. 
III. From Episteme to Scientia 
The Latin equivalent of episteme is scientia. There is no single English word 
that captures perfectly the concept of scientia as it is used by scholastic 
philosophers. "Science" is the obvious English cognate, but our notion of 
science is narrower than the medieval notion of scielltia. It would be perfectly 
natural for Scotus to refer to Perry the mason's scientia of brick-laying, but 
"science" is a dubious translation for two reasons. First, we tend to reserve 
"science" for certain types of theoretical investigation, not the kinds of ac-
tivity distinctive of doing and making. We may regard masonry as a craft, 
perhaps even an art, but it is overly precious to say that masonry is a science. 
Second, we think of science as a sort of community enterprise with a public 
product, something like the accumulated theoretical results and hypotheses 
about the world and its inhabitants, discovered or propounded by the com-
munity of scientists. For that reason it would be odd to refer to Perry s science 
of anything: science is not anyone's private property. 
It would not be odd, however, to speak of Perry's knowledge of masonry, 
and that fact, placed beside etymological considerations, may encourage us 
to render scientia as "knowledge." The noun scientia derives ultimately from 
the verb scire-to know, to be aware that, to know how to-by way of the 
participial adjective sciens-knowledgeable, cognizant, adept. Scientia can 
thus often be translated as "knowledge," perhaps sometimes as "awareness" 
or "expertise." Even so, "knowledge" does not fully capture the meaning of 
scientia. Scientia has a complete declension in the plural. Aquinas, for ex-
ample, can say that categorically different kinds of knowable things lead to 
a diversitatem scientiarum. 16 Here it is tempting to translate the phrase into 
the cognate "diversity of sciences," because the phrase "diversity of knowl-
edges" is grammatically deviant. The temptation can be resisted by the inter-
polation of a type term, resulting in something like "a diversity of [kinds of] 
knowledge," but the point remains that in this respect, "knowledge" does not 
behave in the same way that scientia does. In common with many other 
abstract nouns, "knowledge" behaves syntactically like a mass noun, not a 
count noun, in resisting pluralization, modification by numerical adjectives, 
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and modification by "many" as opposed to "more" and "much. "17 "Knowl-
edge," unlike "science," thus functions aggregatively, not distributively. 
There can be many sciences but you cannot have many knowledges. You can, 
however, acquire more knowledge and you can have knowledge of many 
things. "Science" and scientia, in contrast, function straightforwardly as 
count nouns. 
At the same time, "knowledge" displays its character as an abstract noun 
and its difference from physical mass nouns in the following way. Consider 
the relation between the mass noun "gold" and the referring expression 
"Perry's gold." If Perry has any gold, then Perry's gold comprises a part of 
the extension of "gold," construed, say, as the mereological sum of the world's 
auric regions. If Perry's gold were annihilated, then the extension of the term 
"gold" would necessarily be different from what it had been. But the same 
thing need not happen in the case of the extension of knowledge, construed 
as the collective sum of what is known. If Perry knows nothing that is not 
also known by others, then Perry's knowledge could be annihilated without 
thereby diminishing the world's stock of knowledge. (The stock includes 
practical knowledge. Were the skill of building wooden ships not to be passed 
on, a part of our collective knowledge would be lost.) Unlike gold, knowledge 
is a multipliable commodity. Contrary to the hopes of the alchemists, Perry's 
gold can increase only if the amount of gold that is not Perry's decreases 
correspondingly. Perry's knowledge can wax, however, without anyone else's 
knowledge waning. 
Allowing for the sort of slippage that we have noted, we can still choose 
to translate scientia as "knowledge." Yet if we keep in mind the high standard 
set by the strict version of the ACD-in particular, by the epistemic compo-
nent of the transmission condition-we might be inclined to insist on "un-
derstanding" over "knowledge." For according to the strict version, episteme 
or scientia requires understanding; knowing that P requires knowing the 
explanation for P. I suggest that we not give in to that inclination. We can 
cleave to the strict version, if we wish, using only "knowledge," as long as 
we remember that what counts as knowledge must conform to the epistemic 
transmission condition. More to the point, in addition to scire, to know, Latin 
has iflteliigere, to understand. As we shall see, the two verbs function in 
philosophically important different ways in Scotus's thought. 
We have noted that like "knowledge," sciefltia admits of both absolute and 
relative constructions: there is scientia itself and there is Perry's sciefltia. Let 
us blend that fact in with a distinction, commonly exploited by medieval 
philosophers, between what is evident in itself and what is evident to us. 
Loosely following Aquinas's explication of the distinction, we can say that 
a proposition is evident in itself if it is necessarily true. The paradigm and 
perhaps only case of a necessarily true proposition for Aquinas is a proposi-
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tion in which the attribute denoted by the predicate term of the proposition 
is a part (or the whole) of the essence of the subject denoted by the subject 
term. IS But only some propositions evident in themselves are evident to (all 
of) us, namely, those whose terms are so elementary that anyone who has any 
linguistic capacity must understand the terms. Many other propositions evi-
dent in themselves will be evident to some but not to others, for example, 
"Every dodecahedron is a regular solid." 
If we think of geometry simply as an axiomatized body of propositions, we 
will tend to ignore Perry's scientia of geometry, and to find little use for the 
distinction between a proposition's being evident in itself and its being evi-
dent to us. We will demand that the axioms be evident in themselves. We will 
tend to regard the epistemic status (as opposed to the alethic status) of indi-
vidual theorems, however, as best left to the epistemology, psychology and 
pedagogy of geometry, not as something to be reflected in the scientia of 
geometry. After all, from a God's-eye point of view, a proposition is evident 
in itself just in case it is evident to him. So we might think of ax iomati zed 
geometry as giving us a taste-perhaps a faint taste, but a taste nonetheless-
of what it is like to know something in the way God knows it. 
But Aristotelian medieval philosophers would have insisted that the situa-
tion is not as tidy as this account suggests. God has no need of demonstra-
tions, since his knowledge is immediate and noninferential. Demonstrations 
are specifically human phenomena, the fabrications of intellects that operate 
under the following constraints. We have limited intellectual acuity and finite 
memory capacity. Our conceptual repertoire is derived solely from the deliv-
erances of the senses: nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu. 
Our reasoning is "discursive," proceeding by compounding and dividing 
(roughly, synthesizing and analyzing) propositions, whose ingredients are 
syncategorematic terms and the categorematic terms corresponding to con-
cepts, and by making inferences that are functions from those propositions 
to other propositions. Finally, we are subject to the vagaries of circumstance. 
Sometimes, like Meno's slave, we enter in the middle of things. Because 
Socrates has employed the techniques of constructive geometry, the diagonal 
theorem is clearer to the slave than the theorems that would be necessary to 
demonstrate it. 19 It would now be good pedagogy to use the theorem as a 
premise in quia demonstrations whose conclusions are some of those other, 
more elementary theorems, theorems that in fact are immediately or ances-
trally necessary for the construction of a propter quid demonstration of the 
theorem the slave already "sees." 
The goal of the strict version of the ACD is the sequential arrangement of 
a body of knowledge into axioms and propter quid demonstrations, in such 
a way that any subsequent part is explained by earlier parts. One indicator of 
the untidiness of human epistemological affairs is that in the rough-and-tum-
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ble of individual learning, the goal is not attained until some time after the 
process of learning has begun: every epistemological Felix Unger was once 
an Oscar Madison. The loose version of the ACD, with its tolerance of quia 
demonstrations, is equipped to cope at least partially with this contingency. 
Even so, both the strict and the loose versions appear to share a common 
assumption-that the goal of demonstration is to induce in humans perfect 
understanding of the relevant subject matter. The distinction between what is 
evident in itself and what is evident to us does not by itself conflict with that 
goal. One could believe, after all, that there can be a sort of division of noetic 
labor. Even if not every proposition will ever be evident to everybody, even 
if some proposition will never be evident to anybody, one might believe 
nevertheless that with enough diligence, every proposition could be made 
evident to somebody or other. Suppose, however, that there is some body of 
knowledge which human diligence is constitutionally insufficient to make 
evident. Suppose, moreover, that this body of knowledge is crucially impor-
tant to humans. What happens then? 
IV. Deviant Demonstrations and Understanding Understanding 
Consider the following syllogisms in Barbara, each purporting to be a propter 
quid demonstration: 
(S3) Every rectangle is a parallelogram. 
Every square is a rectangle. 
.. Every square is a parallelogram. 
(S4) Every carnivore has incisors. 
Every dog is a carnivore. 
.. Every dog has incisors.2o 
(S5) Every created intelligence is a contingent being. 
Every subordinate separated substance is a created intelligence. 
.. Every subordinate separated substance is a contingent being.21 
Recall that in order for a syllogism to conform to the strict version of the 
ACD, its premises must be necessarily true and immediately evident, while 
its conclusion must be necessarily true but not immediately evident. Setting 
aside concerns about the conclusions of these syllogisms, we can still inquire 
about the status of their premises. It appears that Scotus supposes that Eu-
clidean geometry is the paradigm of the triumph of the ACD.22 So (S3), the 
first of the three specimen syllogisms, should pass Aristotelian and Scotistic 
muster: its premises would be supposed to be necessarily true and immedi-
ately evident to anyone who understands their terms. 
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Aristotle and Scotus part company on (S4). For Aristotle, (S4) is on all 
fours with (S3); for Scotus it is not. The difference between Aristotle and 
Scotus would not be revealed merely by one's asking them whether the 
premises of (S4) are necessary. Scotus as well as Aristotle would assent to 
their necessity. The difference between them would emerge, however, if one 
pressed Scotus to elaborate on the type of necessity possessed by (S4)'s 
premises. Scotus knew that the Condemnation of 1277 had condemned the 
proposition "That the simply impossible cannot come about from God or from 
another agent," adding that the proposition is in error "if 'according to nature' 
is understood of 'impossible· ... 23 The effect of this and related condemned 
propositions was to promote God's omnipotence in such a way that what 
might be called "natural necessity" was subject to God's power. For someone 
like Scotus, the truths of geometry cannot be altered, not even by an omnip-
otent being. Nevertheless, the regularities governing the created natural world 
are the outcome of the will of a supremely powerful being. Since the world 
has been created, and is not an everlasting Aristotelian cosmos populated by 
everlasting species, it is natural to suppose that God had maximal discretion-
ary power at his creative disposal, up to the threshold of logical impossibility. 
What then of the premises comprising (S4)? Scotus can acknowledge that 
they are naturally necessary, that is, that they are so pervasive that no natural 
operation or process is a violation of them, and any exception to them could 
come about only through supernatural agency. Scotus may suppose that given 
the way the world works, all carnivores have incisors and all canines are 
carnivores. He may suppose further that the universality exhibited by these 
premises is not simply the result of historical or accidental features of the world, 
unlike the accidental universality of "Every extant panda is herbivorous. "24 At 
the same time, however, he can insist that the natural necessities were insti-
tuted by divine fiat and that an omnipotent God could have instituted different 
regularities-ones that allowed for incisorless carnivores and herbivorous 
canines-because there is no logical contradiction in these notions. Thus the 
premises of (S4) are naturally necessary but logically contingent. 
It is hard to see how a syllogism like (S5) could have fallen into Aristotle's 
ken, if only because the notion of a created being would have been alien 
to him. It is clear from'll 41 that Scotus regards syllogisms like (S5) as 
failing to confer scielltia. (S5) is not a propter quid demonstration, because 
subordinate separated substances are not beings that we can come to know 
by natural means, and so we have no natural reason to assent to (S5)'s minor 
premise. But then neither can (S5) be construed as a quia demonstration from 
effect to cause: if the minor premise is not familiar to us, we cannot take the 
conclusion to be the best explanation for its familiarity. Scotus draws a general 
moral in'll 41. If we were to rely exclusively on natural experience in making 
our inferences about the so-called separated substances, we would follow the 
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ancients in making the wrong inferences. We would conclude, for example, 
as they did, that the subordinate separated substances are everlasting and 
necessary, rather than contingent beings with a temporal origin. 
In ~ 42 Scotus anticipates an objection to the claim that we cannot in 
principle have scientia of a syllogism like (S5). Scotus's presentation of his 
imagined opponent's argument can be cast into syllogistic form: 
(S6) Every necessary proposition whose terms we have come to know 
naturally is a proposition that we can comprehend naturally. 
Every necessary revealed proposition is a necessary proposition 
whose terms we have come to know naturally. 
.. Every necessary revealed proposition is a proposition that we can 
comprehend natura\ly.25 
(S6)'s major premise expresses the intuitively appealing idea that if the terms 
of a proposition are in our conceptual repertoire, then we have all we need 
to know in order to understand the proposition. After all, knowing the 
proposition's syncategorematic terms will enable us to understand its struc-
ture while knowing its categorematic terms will enable us to understand its 
content. What else, we might ask, could possibly be required in order for us 
to understand the proposition? One might therefore expect Scotus to grant 
the major premise of (S6) and attack instead the minor premise. But in fact, 
Scotus offers, in 'll 44, a consideration in favor of the minor premise that he 
never rejects. Believer and nonbeliever alike understand the same proposition 
when the one affirms and the other denies "God is triune." If this were not 
so, the dispute between them would be merely verbal. It is not as if the 
believer has a supernatural understanding of the proposition that the nonbe-
liever lacks. It is rather that the believer believes the same proposition that 
the nonbeliever does not believe, and that both of them know the proposition's 
terms on the same naturally-acquired conceptual base.26 
Since Scotus does not reject (S6)'s minor premise, he must reject the major, 
the premise that seemed initially more intuitively appealing than the minor. 
~ 46 provides an example offered in refutation of this major premise. Suppose 
that Boso's conceptual storehouse lacks the concept of a geometrical triangle. 
Boso does have the concepts of geometrical figure (abstracted, say, from 
quadrangles and the like) and of priority or firstness in a series (abstracted 
from the positive integers). Then, according to Scotus, 
Although that [person's] understanding could form this proposition, "Some 
figure is first," because it can grasp its terms, nevertheless, that formed 
proposition will be neutral for it, because that [proposition] is mediate, in-
cluded in that immediate [proposition], "A triangle is first in this way." And 
because it cannot understand that immediate [proposition], since [it can]not 
[grasp] its terms, therefore it cannot know the mediate [proposition], which 
only has its evidentness from the immediate [proposition].27 
DUNS SCOTUS, DEMONSTRATION, AND DOCTRINE 449 
If you are like me, you acquired your concept of a coniferous tree from 
examples of pines and spruces and your concept of a deciduous tree from 
examples of maples and oaks. Armed with just that experiential basis and 
confronted with the proposition, "Some coniferous tree is deciduous," you 
and I would have understood it. I would have denied the proposition; in fact, 
I once did. Being more cognitively responsible than I, you would have neither 
believed nor disbelieved the proposition. Upon our discovery of the larch, 
we would now come to understand the proposition, "A larch is a deciduous 
conifer," which grounds the truth of the original proposition. If concept A is 
grounded in our experience in a way unconnected to the way in which concept 
B is grounded, then it can happen that although we understand a proposition 
containing both A and B, the proposition is "neutral" for us. That is, we are 
not rationally in a position either to affirm or to deny the proposition. As the 
triangle and larch examples show, we can lack access to another proposition 
that would either justify or refute the original proposition, because we lack 
access to a concept contained in the other proposition. 
Boso is conceptually impoverished with respect to triangles; you and I were 
once victims of larchlessness. These deficiencies are remedied by a suffi-
ciently rich dose of the right kinds of natural experience. When we encounter 
(S5), however, no amount of natural experience will be enough to warrant 
our acceptance or rejection of most propositions about subordinate separated 
substances. We can acquire the concepts of subordination, separateness, and 
contingency by natural means and still never be in a position to know natu-
rally that it is necessarily the case that every subordinate separated substance 
is contingent. Thus does Scotus reject the major premise of (S6). 
These Scotistic passages are no less interesting for what they presuppose 
than for what they say. Note first that ~ 46 depends on a distinction between 
intelligere (to understand) and scire. Boso understands the proposition, 
"Some figure is first" (S), but neither knows the proposition to be true nor 
knows it to be false. In contrast, Boso neither understands nor knows the 
proposition, "A triangle is first" (1), as long as Boso lacks the concept of a 
triangle. S is neutral for Boso's understanding because it could only be known 
by Boso's knowing T, which "includes" S. I take it that T includes S only if 
T, perhaps in conjunction with some other necessarily true propositions such 
as "Triangles are figures," entails S.28 So Boso's understanding is neutral with 
regard to S because the only way in which Boso could know S's truth-value 
is by knowing the truth of T, but Boso cannot know the truth of T if he cannot 
understand T, and Boso cannot understand T if he lacks the geometer's con-
cept of a triangle. It is not just that T entails S: Scotus claims that the only 
cognitive access that a person could have to S is through knowing and thus 
understanding T. 
Consider now Scotus's deployment of intelligere and cOlllprehendere, along 
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with their cognates. It is tempting to translate both verbs as "understand," 
and I have used the noun "understanding" to translate intellectus. 29 I suggest 
that we resist the temptation, availing ourselves of the etymologically equiv-
alent "comprehend" for comprehendere. Norman Kretzmann's analysis of 
Augustine's influentia I views on faith and understanding identifies 
Augustine's use of intelligere with "assent to a proposition in virtue of its 
having been clarified or supported (or both) by one's reason on the basis of 
analysis and argument. "30 This sense of intelligere, as rational propositional 
assent, is conceptually as close as you please to Scotus's use of com-
prehendere in (S6) in ~ 42.31 But Scotus's use of intelligere in ~ 46 does not 
correspond to rational propositional assent. Boso understands the proposition, 
"Some figure is first," but is not in a position rationally to assent to or dissent 
from it. As Scotus puts it, the proposition is neutral for Boso. Thus, although 
comprehending a proposition entails knowing it, we have already seen that 
understanding a proposition, in the sense specified by ~ 46, does not entail 
knowing it. 
The notion of neutrality is important to Scotus. It crops up again at the 
beginning of his resolution of the main question, whether it is necessary for 
man in his present state to be supernaturally inspired with some doctrine. In 
~ 57, Scotus says: 
I respond therefore to the question first by distinguishing in what ways 
something may be called supernatural. For a receptive power is related to the 
act which it receives or to the agent from which it receives. In the first way 
the power itself is natural, or violent, or neutral. It is called natural if it is 
naturally inclined, violent if it is against a natural inclination of the patient, 
neutral if it is neither naturally inclined toward that form which it receives 
nor to the opposite. Now in this relation there is no supernaturalness. But 
when a receptive [power] is related to an agent from which it receives a form, 
then there is naturalness when the receptive [power] is related to the kind of 
agent that is set by nature to impress such a form on such a patient, but [there 
is] supernaturalness when it is related to an agent whose fonn is not naturally 
impressed onto that patient.32 
The idiom of a receptive power receiving a form might suggest that Scotus 
has in mind only sense perception. 33 It is clear from his subsequent discussion, 
however, that he means to include-indeed, focus on-the case of the under-
standing entertaining propositions ("complexes," ~ 62). Even when our 
senses and understanding are functioning optimally, Scotus says (in ~ 62), 
"many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us, the knowl-
edge of which is necessary for us. "34 The understanding is naturally inclined 
to accept the proposition that the planets do not twinkle. Perhaps "violence" 
occurs when the understanding is confronted with absurdities, such as (to 
borrow a favorite medieval example) "A goat-stag exists." But left to its own 
natural devices, the understanding should remain neutral with respect to 
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"Every subordinate separated substance is a created intelligence." In all of 
these cases, "there is no supernaturalness;" the understanding is behaving as 
it naturally apt to behave. A natural agent can only instill natural knowledge 
in us. Supernatural inspiration can only come about through a supernatural 
agent working on the understanding. But, as Scotus explicitly claims in 'II 65, 
a supernatural agent can infuse both natural knowledge-you might have 
learned your geometry from an angel-and supernatural knowledge, say, that 
God is triune. 
Syllogism (S5), then, is not a Scotistic demonstration. (S5) cannot produce 
scientia in us because its minor premise is not naturally evident to any of us. 
As far as our natural understanding is concerned, we should regard the minor 
premise as neutral, even though we understand all its terms. If genuine faith 
can only come about by divine inspiration, then a person of faith might have 
justified true belief with respect to the minor premise. Even so, that cognitive 
state will not be scientia. 
V. A Rude Awakening 
Having issued the caveat contained in 'II 12, Scotus proceeds immediately to 
present a series of five arguments in refutation of the philosophers' opinion 
that we have no need for supernatural knowledge. 35 We might have expected 
Scotus's arguments to emulate Aristotelian demonstrations as much as possi-
ble while obeying the constraints alluded to in 'II 12. All five arguments 
deserve detailed analysis, but on some other occasion. I want, however, to 
look at the structure of the first argument in order to provide some idea of 
how far removed it is from the Aristotelian ideal of demonstration. 
The first argument is deployed in 'II'II 13-16. These sections have the fol-
lowing structure. The major premise, which is announced at the beginning of 
'II 13, is immediately followed by an argument to which the major premise is 
supposed to be the conclusion. At the end of 'II 13, the minor premise is 
presented and the conclusion drawn. 'II 14 offers a kind of empirical consid-
eration for the truth of the minor premise. 'II 15 purports to establish the minor 
premise by reason. In 'II 16 Scotus argues concessively for the truth of the 
minor premise. The syllogism comprising the argument is this: 
[Major premise] For every being that acts through knowledge, a distinct 
knowledge of its end is necessary. 
[Minor premise 1 Man cannot know his end distinctly from natural things . 
.. Some supernatural knowledge about this [his end] is necessary for him.36 
Afire with Aristotelianism and steeped in terminist logic, we might attempt 
to cast the argument into syllogistic form. But we encounter difficulties the 
moment we start. The major premise, by definition, contains the term that 
takes predicate place in the conclusion. But if we take the necessity expressed 
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in the major premise to be de dicto, then it would be natural for us to recast 
Scotus's version of it as an "A" or universal affirmative proposition: 
(It is necessary that) Every being that acts through knowledge is a being that 
has a distinct knowledge of its end. 
Construed in this way, however, it is hard to see how either term, being that 
acts through knowledge or being that has a distinct knowledge of its end, can 
be plausibly located in the conclusion. Moreover, a glance at the minor 
premise might suggest that we interpret it as a de dicto necessary "E" or 
universal negative proposition: 
(It is necessary that) No person is a being that knows its end distinctly from 
natural things. 
Caught up in this interpretive mode, we might then rearrange the conclusion 
so that it comes out as: 
(It is necessary that) Every person is a being that knows its end [distinctly?] 
from supernatural things. 
But if we interpret Scotus's argument in this way, we saddle Scotus with a 
howler. A valid syllogism must have three terms: this construction has five. 
Closely related to this abundance of terms is the fact that the predicate term 
in the conclusion, being that knows its end from supernatural things, appears 
nowhere in what Scotus calls the major premise, or, for that matter, in the 
so-called minor premise. A valid syllogism with a negative premise must have 
a negative conclusion: this syllogism has a negative premise and a positive 
conclusion. It will not help to change the minor premise from negative to 
positive, 
(It is necessary that) Every person is a being that knows its end from super-
natural things, 
for either this is a violation of Scotus's strictures in 'lI 12 or it simply is the 
conclusion. And if we try altering the conclusion from positive to negative, 
(It is necessary that) No person is a being that knows its end from natural 
things, 
we just end up with something identical to the minor premise. 
1 suggest that we start over. A simple-minded approach to the conclusion 
is to identify its deep-structure predicate term with its surface-structure pred-
icate term, namely, is necessary for him. Somewhat more precisely, we might 
take the predicate term to be is necessary for olle. In this case the necessity is 
de re, and if we read this interpretation back into the major premise, we will 
construe it quite differently, as an "I" or particular affirmative proposition: 
Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being that acts 
through knowledge. 
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The predicate is quantified, and so the proposition as a whole is multiply 
quantified. I propose, however, for present purposes, to treat the predicate 
term as a unit. This interpretation of the major premise in turn then suggests 
a refinement on the conclusion: 
Some supernatural knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being that 
acts through knowledge. 
We now have given Seotus justification for calling his major premise the 
major premise. Can we furnish him with a valid syllogism? That depends on 
what we can make of the minor premise. In fact, we now know what the 
minor premise must be if the syllogism is to be valid. The major premise is 
of the form, 
Some Dis N, 
while the conclusion is of the form, 
Some S is N. 
The minor premise must then contain the terms "D" and "S." "D" is the 
middle term, and if the syllogism is valid, "D" must be distributed. Since the 
minor premise cannot be negative (given that the conclusion is positive), and 
since "D" must be distributed, the only way a valid syllogism can be formed 
is if the minor premise is of the form, 
Every D is S. 
If we make the appropriate substitutions, we end up with the syntactically 
anomalous 
Every distinct knowledge of one's end is supernatural knowledge of one's 
end. 
We have seen that in some respects, "knowledge" behaves as if it were a mass 
noun, not a count noun. We can replace the distributive "Every" with the 
agglomerative "All:" 
(3) All distinct knowledge of one's end is supernatural knowledge of one's end. 
What connection is there between this proposition and Scotus's minor prem-
ise, "Man cannot know his end distinctly from natural things?" We can get 
from Scotus's minor premise to proposition (3) if we assume that Scotus's 
minor is tantamount to 
(4) All distinct knowledge of one's end is not natural knowledge of one's 
end, 
and if we assume that 
(5) All nonnatural knowledge of one's end is supernatural knowledge of 
one's end. 37 
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Even if you were happy enough to attribute (5) to Scotus, based, perhaps, 
on his discussion in ~~ 57-65, you will want to point out the ambiguity of 
proposition (4). It wavers between 
(4') Not all distinct knowledge of one's end is natural knowledge of one's 
end 
and 
(4*) All distinct knowledge of one's end is nonnatural knowledge of one's 
end. 
(4') is the more cautious interpretation of Scotus's minor premise, but (4*) 
is needed if we are to get to (3), and (3) is needed if we are to supply Scotus 
with a valid syllogism. I propose to leave (4*) unchallenged, if only for the 
reason that whatever reservations you may have about (4*) will be equally 
applicable to (3). 
The reconstructed syllogism for ~ 13, then, is this: 
(S7) Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being 
that acts through knowledge. 
All distinct knowledge of one's end is supernatural knowledge of 
one's end. 
.. Some supernatural knowledge of one's end is necessary for every 
being that acts through knowledge. 
(S7) is a valid instance of the third-figure Disamis, not the canonical first-
figure Barbara. Moreover, as , 12 predicted, heathen philosophers will find 
themselves able to be unimpressed by the credentials of the minor premise. 
What about the major? Scotus thinks that an argument is needed to establish 
its credentials. The argument he provides in ~ 13, however, is puzzling. Here 
is the text. 
Every being that acts for the sake of an end acts from a desire for the end; 
every being that acts per se acts for the sake of an end; therefore every being 
that acts per se desires, in its way, the end. Therefore, just as for a natural 
being that acts, a desire is necessary for the end for the sake of which it 
should act, so for a being that acts through knowledge (which is also a being 
that acts per se, from Book II of the Physics), a desire is necessary for its 
end for the sake of which it should act. 38 
The first sentence can be converted into a well-behaved Barbara syllogism: 
(S8) Every being that acts for the sake of an end acts from a desire for 
the end. 
Every being that acts per se is a being that acts for the sake of an 
end. 
.. Every being that acts per se acts from a desire for the end. 
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The conclusion of (S8) does not entail the major premise of (S7). The second 
sentence in the passage from ~ 13 carries the argument further, insofar as it 
makes explicit the claim that a being that acts through knowledge is a being 
that acts per se. That proposition, coupled with the conclusion of (S8), entails 
the claim that every being that acts through knowledge acts from a desire for 
the end. Consider now the incomplete syllogism that takes this claim as one 
of its premises and has for its conclusion the major premise of (S7): 
Every being that acts through knowledge acts from a desire for the end. 
[Unknown premise.] 
.. Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being that 
acts through knowledge. 
As it stands, this syllogism manque already has four terms. Since we are 
trying to see how Scotus proposes to get to the conclusion that is in turn the 
major premise of (S7), we should leave the conclusion untouched and bring 
the known premise in line with it: 
Some desire for the end is necessary for every being that acts through 
knowledge. 
[Unknown premise.] 
.. Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being that 
acts through knowledge. 
We now have an incomplete syllogism with the following form: 
Some A is N. 
[Unknown premise.] 
.. Some D is N. 
The unknown premise is thus the minor premise, and it must be compounded 
out of "A" and "D," with "A" the middle term. Moreover, "A" must be 
distributed in the unknown premise (since "A" is not distributed in the major 
premise) and the unknown premise must be positive. The only proposition 
that will fill that bill is "Every A is D." The finished syllogism is thus another 
example of Disamis: 
(S9) Some desire for the end is necessary for every being that acts 
through knowledge. 
Every desire for the end is distinct knowledge of one's end. 
.. Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being 
that acts through knowledge. 
An immediate and understandable response to (S9) is to say that the minor 
premise is obviously false, and that we should not attribute it to Scotus unless 
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its attribution is unavoidable. The problem is that the attribution of it, or of 
other propositions that entail it, seems to be unavoidable if we are going to 
bridge the gap validly between the desire mentioned in the major premise 
and the knowledge referred to in the conclusion. It is tempting to try to defend 
the spirit if not the letter of (S9) along the following lines. For any being that 
acts at all, there is some desire for the goal of that action that will figure in 
the explanation of the action; a fortiori for that special class of beings who 
act through knowledge. Suppose now that there is a supernatural end for 
beings that act through knowledge. These beings cannot desire that supernat-
ural end if they have no beliefs whatsoever about it. For these beings, desires 
are typically propositional in content. Any proposition that is doxastically 
neutral for them cannot, by itself, have any effect on their desires. (In my 
pre-larch days, I assented to "No coniferous tree is deciduous," even though 
the proposition was neutral for me. My assent was simply willful and does 
not constitute a counterexample to the thesis. It is not the proposition that 
affected my desires, but rather my desires, perhaps in conjunction with some 
of my beliefs, that brought about my attitude toward the proposition.) In 
virtue of disclosing supernatural information, the important propositions 
about their ultimate supernatural end would remain forever neutral for these 
beings if they were not vouchsafed some revelatory knowledge, construed, 
be it remembered, merely as justified true belief. Thus, as the conclusion of 
(S9) maintains, these beings need some knowledge of their end. 
This sketch of a defense of (S9) is laden with claims that stand in need of 
further examination, but even if the claims are true, they apply only to a 
contracted version of (S9): 
(S9') Some desire for the [supernatural] end is necessary for every being 
that acts through knowledge. 
Every desire for the [supernatural] end requires distinct knowledge 
of one's end. 
.. Some distinct knowledge of one's end is necessary for every being 
that acts through knowledge. 
To be sure, (S9') yields the right conclusion, that is, the major premise of 
(S7). Note, however, that the minor premise has been modified in two ways 
in passing from (S9) to (S9'). The canonical relation of predication has been 
replaced with a requirement relation. That relation, or some other relation of 
necessary concomitance very much like it, is necessary in order to avoid the 
literal identification, made in the minor premise of (S9), of desires with items 
of knowledge. This modification may be no more cause for alarm than the 
relation of possession that occurs in the major premise and conclusion of 
(S4). But it may also prompt the thought that the logical structure of (S9') is 
really beyond that of a categorical syllogism. 
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The minor premise has been altered in a second way, to make explicit that 
it applies only to desires for the supernatural end. (The modification induces 
a corresponding modification in the major premise.) In most cases, to the 
extent to which desires are dependent on cognitive states, the states need only 
be belief-states, not necessarily knowledge-states. A desire for our supernat-
ural end depends on our having beliefs about that end. Since the acquisition 
of those beliefs depends on divine inspiration, it can be safely assumed that 
the beliefs that are the product of divine inspiration-and not, say, self-delu-
sion-are true and justified. Thus, if we genuinely desire our genuine super-
natural end, then we have knowledge of it, but our knowledge is not 
demonstrative; and, as Scotus insists in 'II 12, as long as we are wayfarers we 
will not know that we have that knowledge. 
It is obvious by now that insofar as (S9') traffics in premises whose truth 
could only be known by revelation, (S9') is a syllogism that will not be 
accepted by heathen philosophers, even though they might have accepted 
(S9')'s conclusion as an item of purely natural knowledge. If the status of the 
conclusion of (S9') is nonetheless tainted by the status of its premises, then, 
because it is the major premise of (S7), it turns out that neither premise of 
(S7) is an item of natural knowledge. In that case the distance between 
Scotus's argument and the arguments acceptable to the heathen philosophers 
is greater than may have first appeared. 
I am keenly aware that it might be possible to produce a more adequate 
interpretation of Scotus's first argument. Scotus's other four arguments also 
await analysis. For various reasons, philosophers have devoted considerable 
energy to lay bare the views on faith and reason held by Augustine, Aquinas, 
Luther, even Gabriel Biel and John Locke. I wish to offer a plea on behalf 
of John Duns Scotus. Philosophers reflecting on the connections and tensions 
between faith and understanding will find that his views will repay the in-
vestment made in coming to understand them. 39 
University of Vermont 
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statement that p, because the fact explains the truth of the statement and the converse is 
not true." See Terence Irwin, Aristotle s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 
p. 124. 
5. The notation is from Storrs McCall, Aristotle s Modal Syllogisms (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1963), p. 6. 
6. Scotus in particular regards both types of demonstrations as legitimate demonstra-
tions. To cite one salient example: according to Scotus, the proposition that God is 
omnipotent is demonstrable propter quid, and the proposition that God's omnipotence 
extends mediately or immediately to every state of affairs that can be caused is demon-
strable by a quia demonstration. See John Duns Scotus, God alld Creatures: The Quodlibe-
tal Questions, translated by Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), Question Seven, pp. 163-164 and subsequent discussion. For a 
defense of the legitimacy of quia demonstrations in Scotus, see Allan B. Wolter, "The 
'Theologism' of Duns Scotus," as reprinted in Wolter's The Philosophical Theology of 
John DUlls Scows, edited by Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), pp. 215-224. 
7. Jonathan Barnes observes about Chapter 13 that quia demonstrations "are not, strictly 
speaking, cases of understanding at all; perhaps with ordinary usage in mind, Aristotle is 
here countenancing a weaker sense of 'understand' than his official one." See Jonathan 
Barnes, Aristotle s Posterior Alialytics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 149; and Irwin, 
loco cit. I shall concentrate on one kind of case of a distinction between quia and propter 
quid demonstrations, without suggesting that this is the only kind of case that Aristotle 
had in mind. 
8. The case of (S I) and (S2) illustrates, among other things, the point that we cannot 
give an adequate account of the ACD solely in proof-theoretical terms. Proof theory is 
consciously designed to be purely syntactic, with no taint of semantics, pragmatics, or 
epistemology. A quia demonstration is on all fours with a propter quid demonstration 
insofar as the former's premises and conclusion are every bit as necessary as the latter's. 
If, from a proof-theoretical point of view, we are latitudinarian enough to say that a theory 
is closed under logical entailment, then all the consequences of its axioms are parts of the 
theory. Since the conclusion of (S I) is necessary, it follows from the null set of axioms, 
and thus (S I) itself, as much as (S2), counts as part of the theory of celestial mechanics. 
To restrict the theory exclusively to Barbara LLL entailments will not sort out (S 1) from 
(S2): if (S2) is a part of celestial mechanics and if the terms in (S2)'s major premise are 
convertible, then (S 1) is also a part of celestial mechanics. 
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9. I do not wish to claim that all quia demonstrations are inferences to the best 
explanation. The case seems most persuasive when, as with (SI) and (S2), the major 
premise is convertible. Consider this example, adapted from Bames, op. cit., p. 150: 
Every marsupial is a mammal. 
Every wallaby is a marsupial. 
Every wallaby is a mammal. 
If we suppose that being a marsupial does not explain why the wallaby is a mammal, this 
syllogism is not a propter quid demonstration. The syllogism is a demonstration of the 
fact that wallabies are mammals, but the wallaby's being a mammal is not an explanation 
of its being a marsupial. (Note that the major premise does not convert.) 
Irwin points out, in effect, that the epistemic component of the transmission condition 
precludes inferences to the best explanation from conferring episiellle. See Irwin, op. cit., 
pp. 124-125. 
10. On this passage and related issues conceming Augustine's attitude to authority as a 
source of justified belief, see Gareth B. Matthews, Thought's Ego in Augustine and 
Descartes (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), chap. 11. 
11. See Confessions, VI, 5. 
12. For a balanced study of this issue, see John F. Wippel, "The Condemnation of 1270 
and 1277 at Paris," The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 7 (1977), pp. 
169-201. 
13. Quod nichil est credendul/I, nisi per se notum, vel ex per se notis possit declarari. 
Henricus Denifle and Aemilio Chatelain (eds.), Chartularilllll Universitatis ParisiellSis, 
vol. 1 (Paris: Delalain, \889), p. 545. 
14. It is thus misleading to claim, in commenting on proposition 37, that "The view that 
the canons of demonstrative science cannot provide the sole criteria for knowledge found 
redoubtable advocates in Scotus and later in Ockham." Eileen Serene, "Demonstrative 
Science," in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
pp. 507-508, emphasis added. 
15. Wolter claims that quia demonstrations for Scotus do confer knowledge, because 
they really do argue from cause to effect. "The cause in question is not the precise reason 
why the predicate inheres in the subject, but why we know that the predicate is so affirmed. 
We are dealing here with logical, not ontological principles, with the order of knowledge, 
not with the order of nature." ("The 'Theologism' of Duns Scotus," in Adams, op. cit., p. 
221, emphasis in original.) Wolter's depiction would appear to beg the question whether 
we do have knowledge in this case. Moreover, a syllogism that explains why we know 
that P is a syllogism about the science that incorporates P but is not a syllogism in the 
science of P. We know that there are nine planets in our solar system because of the 
development of telescopes. The history and optical theory of telescopes, however, is not 
a part of celestial mechanics. On Wolter's view, every quia demonstration changes the 
subject from a domain of inquiry to a meta-domain whose subject matter is our knowledge 
of the original domain. (Think of the difference between a Hilbertian textbook in geometry 
and a journal devoted to the investigation of the structure of human geometrical thought 
and the most effective ways of teaching geometry.) Wolter's account may thus allow quia 
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demonstrations to confer knowledge, but not knowledge of the same subject. My account 
keeps the subject matter fixed, but denies that quia demonstrations confer knowledge, 
construed as episteme. 
16. Saint Thomas Aquinas, SUI/llna Theologiae, la, Q. I, a. I, ad 2. 
17. English mass nouns also resist the indefinite article unless accompanied by a type 
term or measure term. "The bottle contains a wine" is deviant, but not "The bottle contains 
a Burgundy wine" nor "The bottle contains a liter of wine." "A knowledge of Latin is 
useful" is permissible, but seems to be merely a stylistic variation of "Knowledge of Latin 
is usefuL" 
18. Summa Theologiae, la, Q. 2, a. I. 
19. It is ironic that the two most famous examples of geometrical enlightenment in 
philosophical literature have the opposite effect on their subjects. Reading first a theorem 
well into Euclid's Elements, Hobbes said "By God, this is impossible!" He then worked 
his way backwards in the Elements until he saw the theorem's necessity. Meno's slave's 
reaction, emphatically not based on working his way backwards, is "By God, this is 
necessary!" 
20. The example i~ Jonathan Barnes's, not Aristotle's. "This points to the problem: for 
in the whole of the Aristotelian corpus there is not, as far as I am aware, a single perfect 
example of a demonstration." Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," as 
reprinted in Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles 011 
Aristotle: 1. Science (London: Duckworth, 1975), pp. 65-87, esp. p. 66. 
21. This example is suggested by remarks that Scotus makes in 'II 41. 
22. It is no accident that Scotus chooses a geometrical example to illustrate the point 
he wants to make in 'II 46, to be discussed below. 
23. Quod impossibile simpliciter non potest fieri a Deo, vel ab agellte alio.-Error, si 
de impossibili secundum naluralll intelligatur. Denifle and Chatelain, op. cit., p. 552 
(proposition 147). 
24. The species panda apparently began its career as an omnivorous animal, but long 
ago came to specialize on bamboo. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda s Thumb (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1980), essay 1. 
25. Quorum necessariorum eoglloscilllus lerminos Ilaturaliter, et illa possumus 
naluraliter comprehendere; sed omniulIIllecessariorum revelatorulll terlllinos naturaliter 
eognoscimus; ergo etc. Scotus does not attach any modal conditions to the middle term. 
Nothing in our discussion will depend on whether we must actually have come to know 
the temlS of a proposition or whether simply being able to know them is sufficient. 
26. Scotus might have added that it is the believer's faith in and the nonbeliever's 
rejection of the same proposition on the same natural grounds that accounts for the 
believer's cognitive state being meritorious while the nonbeliever's state is not. But he 
did not. To have injected that specifically theological observation into the context of'll 44 
would have needlessly muddied the dialectical waters. 
27. ISle illlelleetus /ieet posset jormare compositionem hanc 'aliqlla figllra est prima " 
quia terminos eius pOlest apprehelldere, tamell illa compositio jormata erit sibi neutra, 
quia ista est lIlediata, inclusa in ista illlmediata 'triangulus est sic primus '; et quia hanc 
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imlllediatalllnon potest intelligere, quia nec terminos eius, ideo non potest mediatalll scire, 
quae ex hac illllllediata tantum habet evidentiam. 
Wolter translates the text from "et quia hanc imlllediatam" forward as "But he would 
be unable to know this immediate proposition because he cannot grasp its tenns. There-
fore, he is not able to understand the mediate proposition, which can be known from the 
immediate proposition alone." ("Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge," 
p. 255.) As I shall argue below, by translating intelligere as "to know" and scire as "to 
understand," Wolter obliterates a distinction Scotus has taken pains to make. 
28. Although Ts thus entailing S is necessary for S's being included in T, that condition 
is sufficient. For present purposes, we can safely ignore the question. We might attempt 
to link the two propositions by means of a syllogism: 
Some triangle is first. 
Every triangle is a figure. 
Some figure is first. 
This syllogism is a valid third-figure case of Disalllis. But the first, or major, premise 
seems to be a dubious translation of "A triangle is first:" the premise suggests the falsehood 
that some particular triangle is first. We might then try: 
Every triangle is first. 
Every triangle is a figure. 
.. Some figure is first. 
This is a case of a valid syllogism in Darapti. 
29. Recall, as I am certain Scotus would, Anselm's famous Proslogion II slogan, 
Quidqllid intelligitllr in intellectll est. 
30. NOnllan Kretzmann, "Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine's Charter for 
Christian Philosophy," in Christian Philosophy, ed. Thomas P. Flint (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 6. 
31. I assume that Kretzmann's characterization of Agustine's intelligere and Scotus's 
notion of cOlllprehendere entail assent only to true propositions. 
32. Ad quaestiollem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur 
supematurale. Potentia enilll receptiva cOlllparatur ad actulll quem recipit, vel ad agentem 
a quo recipit. Primo 1II0do ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, velneutra. Naturalis 
dicirur si naturaliter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationelll passi, 
neutra si neque inclinetur natura liter ad il/am jorman quam recipit neque ad oppositam. 
In hac autem comparatione nulla est supematuralitas. Sed comparando receptivulII ad 
agens a quo recipit jormal/I, lIInc est naturalitas quando receptivllm cOl/lparatur ad tale 
agens quod narulll est natllraliter illlprilllere talelll jorlllan in tali pass(), supernaturalitas 
alltem quando COlllparatllr ad agens quod nOll est Ilaturaliter impressivlllll illius jormae 
ill illud passu III. 
33. Micklem interprets the passage in this way. See Micklem, op. cit., p. 37. 
34. Multae cOlllplexiolles relllanebunt nobis ignotae et nobis nelltme quarum cognitio 
est nobis necessaria. 
35. The five arguments are discussed in '11'1113-53. In '1153 Scotus gives his reasons for 
regarding the fourth and fifth arguments as weaker than the first three. 
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36. Ollllli agenti per cognitiollelll necessaria est distincta cogllitio slli finis. .. Sed 
hOII/O nOli po lest scire ex naturalibus finem SUUIII distincte; igitur necessaria est sibi de 
hoc aliqua cognitio supernaturalis. 
37. Micklem is aware that there is a gap connected somehow with the minor premise, 
but says, mystifyingly, that "the minor premise is in two parts: man is a rational agent, 
and man does not know his end" (Micklem, op. cit., p. 9). 
38. Omne agens propter finelll agit ex appetitu finis; olllne per se agells agit propter 
finelll; igitur omne per se agens suo modo appetit finelll. Igitllr sicut agenti naturali est 
necessarius appetitus finis propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per cognitionem-quod 
etialll est per se agens, ex 1/ Physicortllll-necessarius est appetitus sllifillis propter quem 
debet agere. 
39. I thank Derk Pereboom for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
